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One argument frequently deployed by proponents of European reform is that the EU is particularly vulnerable to
large-scale lobbying by international corporation. But what forces shape the pattern of this lobbying? Joost
Berkhout argues that researchers have put too strong an emphasis on ‘political’ rather than ‘economic’ explanations
for the structure of the EU business lobby community. 
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The presence of a large number of lobbyists in Brussels, many unregistered and unregulated, raises concerns that
special interests have greater influence in EU policymaking than citizens and those representing the public interest.
Even the sheer number of registered lobbyists may make the policy process less transparent. Also, as argued long
ago by Olson (1982), when narrowly interested parties defend the status-quo, they may also make it more difficult to
change public policy. These concerns are particularly salient in the EU now, because the European Commission
aspires to increase public support for the institution by increasing the transparency of its own activities and the
activities of those who try to influence it. Additionally, groups such as the Corporate Europe Observatory and
ALTER-EU reasonably claim that the EU lobby community is systematically biased in favor of business interests.
Academic studies confirm the numerical dominance of business interests, even if evidence for their political
dominance is mixed.
In our recent study, part of the INTEREURO project, we examine the forces that shape the business interest
lobbying community in Brussels. Previous studies show inconclusive and inconsistent findings. On the one hand,
some studies find that businesses and their representatives are attracted to Brussels because EU regulation impacts
their operations, and that this attraction is further strengthened by ‘demand’ for ‘technical’ information on the part of
policy makers primarily in the European Commission. In other words, in policy areas with strong and active
directorate-generals and ‘needy’ policy makers, larger numbers of business interests are present. On the other
hand, and in contrast, other studies indicate that the structure and scope of economic production shapes business
interest representation. In economic sectors with large numbers of firms and those that produce a sizable proportion
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of the total economic pie, we find large numbers of business interest organizations active. The economy ‘supplies’
political pressures.
In our study, we, for the first time, simultaneously include both ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ explanations in our analysis of
lobbyists accredited to lobby the European Parliament (2008-2009). We focus on the numbers of organizations
registered per economic sector. We use information from the websites of business interest associations or individual
firms to classify organizations by their economic sector. We use sector data from Eurostat structural business
statistics for information on the number of firms and their turnover.
Through precise Boolean search strings we link EURO-Lex legislative data to economic sectors in order to assess
the extent to which sectors are regulated through EU legislation. We use expert assessments to link the competence
areas of the Directorate Generals of the European Commission to economic sectors and present those in an
extensive conversion table. In that way, budget and staff numbers that potentially deal with the economic sector are
included in the analysis. Our challenging linking of this data makes it possible to assess the several, distinct forces
that drive the numbers of lobbyists in the European Parliament in the 57 economic sectors included in the study.
Our findings generally support the argument that structural economic factors largely determine numbers of lobbyists.
This is what we find: To start, the distribution of lobbyists over economic sectors is highly skewed, with a small
number of sectors accounting for a large number of lobbyists. This may be due to so-called ‘bandwagon’ behavior on
the part of lobbyists. When we look at all the factors simultaneously, we find that a large number of lobbyists come
from economic sectors with a large number of companies, a large turn-over per company and with substantial
cross-border investment.  These substantial and statistically significant effects for these ‘supply-side’ factors
contrast with the largely insignificant effects for the ‘demand-side’ factors such as the staff numbers and budgets of
Commission DGs.
More generally, these findings suggest that political scientists seem to have put too strong an emphasis on ‘political’
rather than ‘economic’ explanations for the structure of the EU business lobby community. And it also indicates that
collective action by business interests is probably driven by various factors, of which influence in the policy process
is just one out of many others. At the same time, the study may be sobering for those who were mainly looking inside
the Brussels Bubble to ‘resolve’ business dominance, as presence of business lobbyists largely results from the real
functioning economy rather than political imperatives.
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